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Abstract
In this paper we analyze criminal deterrence in the presence of specific psychic costs
of punishments. We consider a dynamic model with three players, analyzing the choices
of a representative lawmaker, potential criminal and judge. In our setting the lawmaker
decides whether to introduce a fixed punishment enhancement above a chosen threshold of
crime level, depending on its popularity among the voters. In reaction, the judge, who is
influenced by her own preferences as well as the opinion of her peer group, might change
the probability of punishment, through affecting the standard of reasonable doubt. Our
results suggest that large discontinuous and mandatory increases in punishment can have
unintended effects that are contrary to the stated goal of such punishment enhancements.
In equilibrium, when either the judge or her peer group is “anti-punishment” enough, the
level of criminal activity might increase in response to the punishment enhancement. This
perverse effect is less likely to occur if there is a higher number of peer groups within the
“elite”, so that a greater extent of self-selection by judges can occur. Our results have
relevance for a number of areas outside the traditional criminal justice system as well, such
as special courts (such as ecclesiastical or military courts), or the strictness and enforcement
of regulations.
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1 Introduction
The economic analysis of crime and punishment goes back to Becker (1968)’s seminal paper,
which forms the basis of a rational choice account of criminal behavior. Since then there has
been a large empirical literature testing the basic predictions of the economic approach to crime,
most of which have been validated (see e.g. Levitt, 2004; Durlauf and Nagin, 2011). For instance,
it has been shown that criminals respond to both increases in the amount of punishment as well
as the probability of punishment, although the elasticity is ususally larger for the latter than for
the former. While the literature on deterrence is wide-ranging, there has been little research on
the determinants of punishment, as opposed to crime. Among the few forays into this area we
can list Andreoni (1991), Glaeser et al (2000) or Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000).
In this paper we attempt to merge two strands of literature: we analyze criminal deterrence,
but in the context of social and political incentives both in the case of lawmakers and judges.
In doing that we build on the literature on social interactions (see e.g. Becker and Stigler, 1974;
Glaeser and Sacerdole, 2003; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Cicala et al, 2015), and in particular, the
literature on peer pressure and esteem and disesteem (Brennan and Pettit, 2005; Cowen, 2002;
Cowen and Glazer, 2007). Moreover, we also build on the political economy and public choice
literatures in assuming that lawmakers do not maximize social welfare, but their private utility.
In this paper we aim to extend economic analysis to the behavior of law enforcers as well as
lawmakers in a way that does not assume them to maximize some social welfare function. The
social welfare maximizing approach is useful when analyzing the welfare implications of crime
and punishment, but it is less suitable when one wishes to understand the behavior of actual
decision makers in criminal policy and law enforcement.
The quest for the approval of others and other social interactions have featured prominently in
the works of early economists, such as Smith (1790). In the later economic literature, however,
such topics have been overlooked, up until the past few decades. The political economy of
punishment also has a long history, but again, modern economic literature has been slow to get
started on this topic. One motivation of our paper has been the intuition provided by Mill (1868)
in his speech in defense of capital punishment, where he notes that the deterrent effect of capital
punishment can be compromized when judges and juries are too reluctant to apply it. A similar,
but more formal statement is found in Andreoni (1991), in which the author claims that higher
penalties may encourage criminal activity. This perverse result is due to the fact that judges are
interested in being right or “just” in their judgement. When the severity of punishment increases
the cost of wrongful conviction also increases, therefore the judge raises the threshold of evidence
for a guilty verdict, thus lowering the probability of conviction. This can lead to the surprising
result that stricter punishment can induce more crime. Yet, in our view, Andreoni’s model is
inadequate in two respects: first, adjusting the probability of conviction in response to higher
probability of a wrongful conviction can actually enhance deterrence as wrongful convictions may
weaken deterrence. Second, judges might have an incentive to lower the probability of conviction
even apart from caring about wrongful convictions.
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Our paper also relates to the literature of credible threats and commitments, starting with
Schelling (1960) which highlights the role of time inconsistency within agents. Closer to our
approach in this regard is the research by Acemoglu and Robinson (2009) who emphasize the
commitment problems in politics, arising from the fact that agreements between decision-makers
often does not result in perfect Coasian solutions as these agreements suffer from a time inconsis-
tency problem. Typically, credible third-party enforcements are rare in politics, thus, promises
and threats are hard to make credible. In our view similar problems can arise in judicial decision-
making, especially when the judicial branch of the government is independent from the executive
branch, and therefore cannot be directly incentivized by the latter. In our model there are mul-
tiple agents involved in deterrence, and it is the differences in incentives faced by these agents
that cause the potential problems in deterrence credibility.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce the problem of punishment costs and
other private incentives faced by lawmakers and judges in relation to punishment, followed by
a model of criminal deterrence with three period. In period 1, the lawmaker decides whether
to introduce an enhanced form of punishment, and she chooses the threshold above which the
enhanced punishment must be applied by the judge. In the second period, the potential criminal
chooses a crime level, her utility depending on the gross benefit of crime as well as on the expected
punishment. In period 3, the judge makes a decision regarding the probability of punishment
through choosing a threshold of evidence. We assume that the judge faces positive psychic
(social) punishment costs, stemming largely from the potential disesteem by other members of
her peer group. One of our main result suggests that the level of criminal activity may increase
in response to the punishment enhancement. In section 5 we provide some examples which our
framework can be applied for and finally we conclude.
2 Incentives in punishment
The standard economic model of crime and punishment (see Becker, 1968) focuses on the behav-
ioral responses a criminal might have to the changing costs and benefits of the criminal activity.
However, it does not extends the analysis to the incentives faced by the actors in the penal
system. Therefore, the literature that followed Becker has typically assumed, explicitly or im-
plicitly, that lawmakers, judges and prosecutors maximize a utilitarian social welfare function
and aim to determine optimal punishments. Much of these literature has been concerned with
what the optimal punishment should be in a given situations and on how criminals respond to
different punishment regimes, thus helping policy-makers choose the right approach to criminal
policy. However, accounting for the incentives of judicial and political decision-makers may be
important for a number of reasons. For example, the interaction of these incentives might not
produce criminal sentences that are consistent with optimal punishment theory. This question
has been studied by Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000), who conclude that in a number of cases the
criminal justice system does not work according to basic optimal punishment criteria. The au-
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thors show, for example, that black criminals typically receive higher sentences while murders of
black victims on average are followed by lower sentences than murders of white ones. Moreover,
the murder of a woman is typically punished with a longer sentence than the murder of a man
(see Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2000). Such results indicate that the incentives of participants in
the criminal justice system might have an important impact on the criminal sentences and such
should be taken seriously.
Since Becker (1968)’s paper there has been a decades old debate about the deterrent effect of
capital punishment. For example, Ehrlich (1973) in one of the first modern econometric study
of capital punishment claims that each execution deters 8 murders. Among else, this result has
lead to a reconsideration of criminal policy and many states in the United States reinstated
capital punishment into their books. In a more recent paper, however, Donohue and Wolfers
(2005) argue that much of the empirical work in the topic is highly flawed, as the results are very
sensitive to changes in specifications. Yet, this might be driven by the fact that presently there
are very few executions in the United States, and so researchers simply have too little data to
separate “normal” fluctuation in murder rates from changes due to deterrence from executions.
So while there are studies indicating significant deterrent effects, there are several researchers as
well as public figures who are not persuaded by this evidence.
There are other cases as well where there is some skepticism toward the efficacy of tough
sentencing laws. Often, the skeptics provide explanations based on short-sighted or outrightly
irrational behavior on the part of criminals. In this paper we offer an explanation where criminals
respond perversely to the introduction of a (mandatory) punishment enhancement precisely
because they are rational and forward-looking enough. The mechanism we are about to elaborate
and model is roughly the following. Suppose that over a specific threshold of evidence (of the
nature of crime) a defendant has to receive an enhanced punishment. We assume that judges
have some power over determining this threshold of evidence, that is, the judge has some influence
over the probability that defendants are found guilty. Among else, we will concentrate on the
judge’s decision of this probability. It is traditionally assumed that the probability of punishment
and the severity of punishment are independent of each other. In this paper, however, we will
show that under certain circumstances this might not be the case. If the punisher faces some,
either psychic or reputational costs from a very strict sentence, she might have an incentive to
lower the probability of conviction. However, if would-be criminals foresee this behavior, than
they will also adjust their behavior accordingly. While the introduction of a “tough” punishment
enhancement increases the severity of punishment, lowering the probability of conviction can
offset this effect. Depending on its magnitude, it can even lead to a decrease in the expected
cost of committing a crime that is followed by that particular punishment enhancement. If this
is so, then the would-be criminal has a greater incentive to commit a corresponding level of
crime. The reason such a scenario might come about is that criminal policy-makers and judges
face different incentives: policymakers might face a strongly pro law and order public opinion,
so they want to ensure that the most serious crimes are met with a serious punishment. On the
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other hand, judges may be more influenced by the opinion of their peer group, whose members
might disapprove of punishments which are considered by them too strict. Therefore, applying
the penalty is personally costly for them. Note, that we do not describe a relationship between
strictness and probability of punishment so that probability always changes as the applicable
punishment changes. Instead, we assume that the change in probability occurs when there is a
jump in the severity of punishment after a given threshold. Continuous increases in punishment
are, in our model, proportional to increases in the crime level, while the discontinuous change
after the established threshold is not. The latter change is therefore both more salient and
possibly more outrageous or delighting to the audience (voters, to the lawmaker and peers, to
the judge).
Lawmakers of course usually do not restrict the judiciary as strongly as we have assumed
in the above thought experiment. They typically determine an interval within which judges are
usually expected to apply the middle-way punishment. However, if policy-makers know that,
and therefore expect judges to apply the penalty only very rarely, they might still tie the judges’
hands by specifying certain cases where capital punishment needs to be applied.
3 Attitudes in crime and punishment
A motivating observation behind our model is that attitudes toward crime and punishment can
affect both lawmaking as well as the justice system by electoral incentives in the former and
approbation or social incentives in the latter case. Such attitudes often strongly differ between
different parts of the population and can be thought of as ideological groups (Haidt, 2012), or,
as we assume in this article, there can be a difference in the attitudes of different peer groups.
For example, in many European countries, a majority of the population supports certain forms
of strict punishments such as capital punishment or life imprisonment without parole as well as
generally having a “tough on crime” attitude, while members of the intellectual “elite” often hold
diametrically opposite views on these matters (see e.g. Whitehead et al, 1999). Moreover, Baum
(2007) provides compelling evidence that judges are influenced by the opinions of their social
groups, and these opinions often reflect “elite” preferences.
It would be interesting to examine how these different views form, although this paper cannot
embark on this task. However, it can still be useful to consider some possible mechanisms.
There are ample evidence that political and societal views are partly determined by personality
traits, many of which are likely to be innate (see e.g. Haidt, 2012). Personality traits also
correlate with education and income, thus establishing correlations between belonging to some
“elite” group and having certain beliefs. However, it is also possible that societal beliefs form
endogenously. For instance, certain views which are salient enough can serve as signals about the
personality, or general political inclination of an individual. Members of particular groups might
wish to coordinate along the same or similar beliefs in order to signal their membership in that
group. In order for such a coordination to be possible, the said view should be salient or focal
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enough, following Schelling (1960)’s concept of focal points. A possible further consequence can
be that beliefs can at times be especially stark, and possibly starker than it would be optimal.
Within certain social groups there can also occur some social learning (see e.g. Glaeser and
Sunstein, 2009) where group members learn new information primarily from their fellow group
members and this leads to large between-group differences and smaller within-group differences
in beliefs. Social influence therefore can be purely informational but it can also affect attitudes
and political preferences, or simply the expression of such preferences. Kuran (1997) documents
the phenomenon of “preference falsification”, the practice abundant across human societies, where
members of a group are not willing to express views different from the perceived majority opinion,
leading to a “pluralistic ignorance”, where the majority might not hold a particular view anyone,
yet group members still believe it does so they do not challenge it, as public deviation from a
“sacred” opinion is costly.
4 The Model
In this section we analyze a simple sequential-move game with 3 periods. First the lawmaker
decides whether to introduce a particular form of punishment and sets a threshold of crime level
above which the punishment has to be applied by the judge. In the second period, the potential
criminal (from now on we simply refer to her as criminal) chooses a level of crime and in the
third period the judge determines the probability of conviction, which is her only choice variable,
as the applicable punishment is determined by the lawmaker.
4.1 The lawmaker’s problem
The lawmaker chooses the threshold x¯, depending on the following considerations: we assume
that the lawmaker is indifferent toward social welfare and will not choose x¯ so to maximize a
social welfare function, instead, she derives utility (or rather: she evades disutility) by choosing
according to the preferences of the median voter. Moreover, we assume that the lawmaker is also
influenced by the preferences of the median voter of her party which may differ from the former
one because of ideological commitments.
The lawmaker makes two choices: first decides whether to introduce a punishment enhance-
ment α, and after a threshold, x¯, for which the enhancement needs to be applied.
The lawmakers’s utility function is given with
U(x¯) = ψ − tl(xv − x¯)2 − zl(xp − x¯)2 (1)
where ψ is the utility she derives from the introduction of the enhancement, xv is the preferred
threshold of the median voter and xp is the preferred threshold of the median party voter (from
now on we will refer to it as the party median). We assume that 0 ≤ x¯ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ xv ≤ 1, 0 ≤
xp ≤ 1. We do not make any restrictions on either the magnitude of the sign of ψ, so it could be
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positive as well as negative. We also note that ψ captures the preferences of both the general as
well as the party median.
The intuition behind the above formalization is that both voters among the general population
and loyal party voters care about the lawmaker’s decision in criminal affairs. We do not specify
the preferences of the party voters, and neither do we fully specify other voters’ preferences. We
assume that voting is the simple majority voting. This allows us to concentrate on the effect
of the median voter’s preferences. Furthermore, for the party voters’ preferences we also take
the median. If ψ > 0, merely introducing the punishment enhancement α, the lawmaker gets
rewarded by the median voter. However, if she does not choose the threshold level favored by
the median voter or the median party voter, she receives some punishment, which depends on
the distance between her choice and the median voter’s preference and takes a strictly convex
form. We denote with tl and zl the parameters determining how much the lawmaker cares about
deviating from the median voter’s position xv and the party median xp, respectively.
As for the first choice, the lawmaker introduces the enhancement if and only if
ψ > tl(x
v − x¯)2 + zl(xp − x¯)2 (2)
Obviously, if ψ is zero or negative, so that the punishment enhancement is generally not popular
or outright unpopular among the voters, the lawmaker never introduces the enhancement. From
the first order condition we have that:
2tlx
v − 2tlx¯+ 2zlxp − 2zlx¯ = 0
which yields:
x¯ =
tlx¯
v + zlx¯
p
tl + zl
(3)
Remark 1 Note that if tl = zl then x¯ = x¯
v+x¯p
2 . In this special case, the lawmaker’s chosen x¯
will be an average of the preferred thresholds of the voters and her fellow party members.
4.2 The criminal’s problem
The potential criminal chooses a level of crime denoted by x. The level of crime can have
various interpretations: it can mean either the number of crimes committed, or, perhaps most
appropriately for our model, the seriousness of the committed crime. If x = 0, the criminal does
not commit any crime (therefore, he is not a criminal, in this case). The potential criminal’s
utility from crime has the following properties: the criminal’s utility consists of a gross benefits
from the crime, B(x), and the expected cost of the crime, F (x), and we assume that both the
benefits and the costs are increasing in x. More formally, we assume that ∂B(x)/∂x > 0 and
∂F (x)/∂x > 0. However, we assume that if a punishment enhancement is introduced by the
lawmaker then there is a jump in the criminal’s cost function: after a certain level of x, (denoted
by x¯), the criminal faces an enhanced punishment, F (x) + α, where α > 0. Beside, there can
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also be a kink in the function, as the probability of punishment can be higher or lower below
and above the threshold. We denote the probability below the threshold as p and the probability
above the threshold as p′. We allow for the possibility that p = p′.
The criminal’s utility function takes the following form:
EU(x) = B(x)−
pF (x) if x ≤ x¯p′(F (x) + α), if x > x¯ (4)
Besides the monotonicity of B(x) and F (x), we assume that both functions are continuous, twice-
differentiable and concave. The first two assumptions are imposed for tractability reasons, while
the latter assumption is made in order to approximate real life conditions, where the marginal
increase in punishment is rarely equal and usually lower than the marginal increase in the crime
level. In order to guarantee the existence of an interior solution, we assume that pF ′′(x) > B′′(x)
and B′′(x) < pF ′′(x) for every level of x. That is, the criminal’s cost function is steeper than
his benefit function at any crime level below the threshold, so that the two functions intersect
giving an interior solution.1
From the criminal’s problem we get the following first order conditions:
i) In Case I:
∂B(x)
∂x
= p
∂F (x)
∂x
(5)
ii) In Case II:
∂B(x)
∂x
= p′
∂F (x)
∂x
(6)
If p′ < p, the optimal crime level is higher above the punishment threshold. However, above the
threshold the criminal has to pay the additional α punishment enhancement which is a fixed cost,
so it does not influence the marginal decision. It does however influence whether the criminal
will go above the threshold. The condition for this is p′(F (x) + α) > pF (x), leading to:
p′
p
>
F (x)
F (x) + α
(7)
Notice, that as p changes above the threshold level x¯, the marginal expected punishment curve
becomes either steeper of less steep and we did not make any assumption regarding these cases.
Therefore, first of all, it is completely possible to have no interior solution if a kink occurs before
the marginal expected punishment curve would intersect the marginal benefit curve. In this case,
1Alternatively, we could assume that B(x) is concave, while pF (x) is convex. This assumption would guarantee
not only the existence but the unicity of a interior solution. However, in real life the punishment function seldom
if ever can be described as increasing and convex. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that both in the concave
as well as the convex case we can imagine a situation where there is only one intersection and x¯ is set above the
optimal criminal choice x∗. The reason for this is that as long as voters are largely uninformed about criminal
statistics, which could be assumed under rational ignorance, and the lawmaker does not care about social welfare,
the lawmaker might choose an x¯ which is above the crime level the criminal would choose, however that would
be irrelevant from a deterrence perspective.
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if p decreases and α is not high enough to offset this change, the criminal will always choose
x = 1. However, if p decreases and the kink occurs after B′(x) and pF ′(x) intersect, another
problem arises: uniqueness of the optimum is not assured as if the marginal expected punishment
curve becomes steep enough after the kink it can have two intersections with the marginal benefit
curve. However, only one of these two possible optima will be chosen by the criminal. As we
have shown above, the optimum selection will be guided by taking into account the value of α.
If p′(F (x) + α) > pF (x), so that the condition p
′
p >
F (x)
F (x)+α holds, the criminal will choose the
crime level at the intersection that occurs before the kink. Examining further the case when the
marginal benefit and the marginal expected punishment functions have two intersections, we also
note that the second intersection is not a stable optimum as in that point and its environment
the p′F ′(x) function is steeper than the B′(x) function, therefore, by increasing the crime level
above the second possible optimum, the criminal increases her utility. It is easy to see that
provided the conditions under which there exists two intersections, the higher potential optimum
will not actually be at the point of the second intersection, but at x = 1. Formally:
Remark 2 If there exist x∗ and x∗′ such that x∗ < x∗′ and B′(x∗) = pF ′(x∗), B′(x∗′) =
p′F ′(x∗′) both hold, then x∗′ is not a stable optimum. By choosing an arbitrary x∗′ +  crime
level, where  > 0, the criminal’s utility is strictly higher in the latter case: B(x∗′+)−p′F (x∗′+
) > B(x∗′) − p′F (x∗′), therefore the criminal is better off increasing the crime level beyond
x∗′. Also, as B′′(x) > p′F ′′(x) when x¯ ≤ x ≤ 1 (the condition that needs to hold when there
are two intersections), the criminal increases the crime level until it reaches the maximum.
Therefore, if the criminal chooses a crime level that is above x¯ and the marginal benefit and
expected punishment functions intersect twice, the criminal will choose x = 1, the highest possible
crime level.
4.3 The judge’s problem
In the last period, the judge chooses the probability of a guilty verdict, p. We assume that the
judge can effect the probability through adjusting the threshold above which the defendant is
considered guilty. This assumption can be supported by the observation that this threshold is
generally not spelled out in any of the sentencing guidelines, so judges enjoy some degree of
freedom over it. We assume that the judge’s utility depends on two variables: her preferred
probability, po, and the preferred probability of her peer group, pp. If she chooses a p that differs
from her preferred value, the judge receives some disutility. Since the judge is also influence by
the prevailing attitude, she derives a disutility by moving away from pp as well. Our preferred
interpretation of this peer effect is that the judge receives some punishment from any member of
the “elite” for deviating from their position. Such punishment can take many forms: fewer invi-
tations to certain social or public events, fewer friendship offers or simply a general disapproval.
Different members of this peer group might administer different levels of punishment, depending
on their own preferred value of p. We assume that the judge by making her decision will consider
the average of all these punishments.
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In the followings we first briefly outline a background model for the formation of peer groups
and derive some conclusions about how much peer group membership will influence judicial
behavior in different conditions. Next, we consider the choice problem of a representative judge
in our punishment game.
4.3.1 Formation of peer groups
Suppose that judges receive their compensation in three forms: they receive a monetary wage,
wm, a general non-monetary wage, wp, that largely depends on working conditions and is in-
dependent of work effort and productivity, and a social wage, ws, which comes from being a
member of a complementary social group. In the later assumption we follow Cicala et al (2015)
and we assume a judicial labour market and a social market such that w′m
(
∂f(j)
∂lj
)
> 0 and
w′s
(
∂f(e)
∂sj
)
> 0. I.e., the judge’s wages are positively related to her marginal product in both
the labor market and the social market, respectively. We do not make any assumption about
the market structures, leaving our results applicable for various different cases. We assume that
making judicial decisions that go against the preferences of the judge’s peer group lowers her
marginal product in the production of the peer group’s social goods, for various reasons: it might
indicate a worse complementarity between the judge and other members of the group, so their
interactions will be less productive in the future; it might cause distress among group members,
again lowering her productivity. The judge can avoid this by making choices and expressing
views that are consistent with the average position in the group. We assume therefore that the
social wage is a function of the difference between the peer group members’ average position and
the judge’s revealed position, and can be written in the following general form:
ws = w¯s − µ|p− o|
where w¯s denotes the social wage the member would get if her revealed position would be equal
to the group position, p stands for the group’s position, o is the peer group member’s own
position and µ is a positive parameter expressing the effect of a given distance from the peer
group position on the social wage. We assume that a country (or other administrative unit)
with greater population has more opportunity to form new peer groups. The intuition behind
this assumption is that investing in group specific human capital has some fixed cost, and the
bigger the market, the more groups can be supported. This is, in essential an application of
the well-known “the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market”: in our setting, the
extent of the division of labor means specialization into different peer groups. There can be for
example a “tough” and a “soft” peer group with respect to punishment, often combined with “left”
and “right wing” views. In the long run equilibrium, judges can sort into different peer groups,
from all of which they get a given social wage.
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4.3.2 Specialization and the extent of the market
One corollary of our assumptions is that an increase in the number of peer groups should increase
the reservation wage w¯s of a random peer group member, and in turn, as a greater population
can support a greater number of peer groups. In other words, specialization is limited by the
extent of the market, countries with greater populations should have more “elite” peer groups
and membership in these peer groups should have a smaller effect on judicial decision-making.
More specifically, consider an “elite” population of Ne, and its n partition. Let us assume that
these peer groups are distributed along a policy space [0, 1], where a 0 position means an extreme
anti-punishment or “left-wing” position, while a position 1 means an extreme pro-punishment or
“right-wing” position. The peer groups have a distribution that is not specified here. We assume
that the number of members in a peer group is greater than one. Assume that the positions
these peer groups inhabit along the policy space is the average of the positions of their members.
Individuals can decide which peer group they join or quit and we assume that they cannot
themselves form a “singleton coalition”, so they must belong to a peer group.
Suppose that individuals, following the previous outline, are rewarded in their peer groups
according to their marginal product, and assume that the marginal product depends on the
difference between the group position (the group average) and their respective revealed individual
position. Thus, the closest a member is to a group position, the higher social wage she receives
from that group. Therefore, any individual will join the peer group whose position is the closest
to her own position.
Consider a marginal individual i in a market with two peer groups, with half way between
the two peer group’s positions, a and b (i.e. i = a+b2 ). She is indifferent between joining the
two groups, so she randomly joins one of the groups in that case, as |a − a+b2 | = |b − a+b2 |.
Now consider what happens when a new group enters the market, with a position c, such that
a < c < b. Regardless of whether c is smaller or greater than a+b2 , c will be i’s new chosen group,
as the social wage she receives there, w¯s − µ|c − a+b2 | > w¯s − µ|a − a+b2 | = w¯s − µ|b − a+b2 |.
Notice that all three peer groups now have to pay i more than before in order for i to join any
of them, as the reservation wage is w¯′ = w¯s − µ|c − a+b2 |, whereas previously it was equal to
w¯s − µ|a − a+b2 | = w¯s − µ|b − a+b2 |. It follows, that an increase in the number of peer groups
increases the reservation wage and therefore lowers the marginal social wage received from any
peer group.
So far we assumed peer group position as exogenous, assuming that any individual member
does not influence the position of the peer group, as there are a large enough number of individuals
in any group. Now suppose that this condition does not hold. To show that our results hold in this
case as well consider the following. Suppose that there is a preexisting group position a and b and
individual i with a position a+b2 . However, now if an individual decides to join either group (and
we assume that she basically has to join one), than simply by joining and thus influencing the
group’s position in her own direction, her social wage will always be higher than w¯s−µ|a− a+b2 |.
So if she joins group a, she will receive w¯s−µ|a′− a+b2 |, where w¯s−µ|a′− a+b2 | > w¯s−µ|a− a+b2 |,
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since a′ > a. Now consider what happens when a group with a position c (with the previous
conditions applying) enters the market. It is easy to see that i can only receive a higher social
wage after the entry, the only difference being is that there will be a new group position for the
entrant c′ such that |c′− a+b2 | < |c− a+b2 |. That is, it can be shown that when peer group members
have some market power, that is, they can partially set the position of a group, the increase in
the reservation wage is even greater, and therefore the effect on judicial decision-making of an
increase in the number of peer groups is also greater.
4.3.3 The judge’s choice
In the following we add the following specifications to our outline above: we assume that the
judge’s disutility that comes from deviation from the peer group position takes a quadratic form.
This assumption does not influence the comparative statics of our results but greatly simplifies
our calculations. We further assume that being a judge gives the judge a baseline utility that
depends on her monetary wage, her working conditions as well as her social wage received by her
respective peer group. This baseline utility is written as U¯(wm, ws, wp) and we assume that it is
increasing, continuous, twice differentiable and concave for all the variables. We do not make any
restrictions concerning either the judge’s or her peer group’s average preferences, yet we assume
that 0 ≤ po ≤ 1, 0 ≤ po′ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pp ≤ 1, 0 ≤ pp′ ≤ 1. Therefore, we allow both the judge’s own
ideal position and the peer group’s ideal position to change in any direction above x¯.
The judge’s utility function can be written as:
Uj(p, wm, ws, wp) = U¯(wm, ws, wp)−
tj(po − p)2 + zj(pp − p)2, if x ≤ x¯,tj(po′ − p)2 + zj(pp′ − p)2, if x > x¯ (8)
If x > x¯, the judge needs to administer higher punishments for any crime level in this interval.
The judge determines the probability of punishment p, and she has a preferred or ideal p in each
cases (po and po′). She derives disutility from deviating from these ideal values. She also faces
some form of punishment by deviating from the preferred p of the median member of her peer
group. From the first order conditions we have that:
i) In Case I:
2tjp
o − 2tjp+ 2zjpp − 2zjp = 0
or
p =
tjp
o + zjp
p
tj + zj
(9)
ii) In Case II:
2tjp
o′ − 2tjp+ 2zjpp′ − 2zjp = 0
or
p =
tjp
o′ + zjpp′
tj + zj
(10)
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The p chosen by the judge can be higher or lower depending on whether the criminal chooses
x below or above the threshold. p decreases above the threshold if the judge herself is lenient
enough, that is, it gives her disutility to administer especially strict punishments, or her peer
group is lenient or anti-punishment enough. In the converse cases, the judge is more likely to
choose a higher p above the threshold. Note that, as we have seen in the previous subsection, the
larger the number of peer groups the judge can join, the lower the influence of the peer group
will be, as the judge can more easily self-select into a group whose position is close enough to
her own position.
4.4 Equilibrium and comparative statics
To solve the game for its subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium we use backward induction. To do
so, we substitute the results of the judge’s maximization problem to the choice problem of the
criminal. Thus, the criminal’s problem can be written as:
EU(x) = B(x)−

tjp
o+zjp
p
tj+zj
F (x) if x ≤ x¯
tjp
o′+zjpp′
tj+zj
(F (x) + α), if x > x¯
(11)
First order conditions lead to:
i) In Case I:
∂B(x)
∂x
=
tjp
o + zjp
p
tj + zj
∂F (x)
∂x
(12)
ii) In Case II:
∂B(x)
∂x
=
tjp
o′ + zjpp′
tj + zj
∂F (x)
∂x
(13)
Intuitively, increasing the severity of punishment above a threshold level x¯ can have two pos-
sible effects: the severity of punishment increases, but, if the judge is not “tough” enough, the
probability of receiving any punishment decreases, so the final effect on expected punishment,
and therefore, the level of crime chosen is ambiguous, depending on the values of the exogenous
variables in the model. Examining the equation we get from the criminal’s problem through
backward induction, we can see that the more lenient the judge’s peer group and the judge her-
self is, the higher the level of crime the criminal will choose in both cases. Also, the more po′ or
pp′ is larger than po or pp, respectively, the more likely is that the criminal will choose a crime
level above the threshold.
As we have seen from the lawmaker’s problem above, the lawmaker’s choice does not de-
pend on either the judge’s or the criminal’s decision, so the statements made on her individual
maximization problem apply. From that, the solution for x¯ is given by:
x¯ =
tlx¯
v + zlx¯
p
tl + zl
(14)
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Our model implies the following results:
Proposition 1 Criminal activity x decreases in p and F (x). A sufficient increase in α leads
the criminal to choose a crime level that is no higher than x¯.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Intuitively, if only the severity of punishment F (x) changes above the threshold levels, x should
decrease, but p is not independent of F (x). When judges are “strict” enough, the probability of
conviction can increase above x¯.
Proposition 2 There is an α∗, such that for an α < α∗ a decrease in x¯ will always increase x
if p′ < p and will always decrease it if p′ > p.
Proof: see Appendix B.
A decrease in the probability of conviction decreases the expected marginal cost of crime and
ceteris paribus increases the crime level. The opposite holds in the case of increasing probability.
However, for a big enough α, p′ < p is not enough for this to hold. As we have seen in the
discussion of the criminal’s problem, if the condition p′(F (x) + α) > pF (x) holds, decreasing x¯
ceteris paribus decreases x.
Proposition 3 x∗ ≤ x¯ if and only if p′(F (x) + α) > pF (x)
Proof: see Appendix C.
That is, the crime level will never be higher than the threshold chosen by the lawmaker if either
the probability increases after the threshold or the punishment enhancement is big enough to
offset the effect of a decrease in p. If either of these is not the case, the criminal will choose an
x such that x > x¯.
5 Examples and extensions
5.1 Examples
Our model offers a number of possible applications and extensions. First of all, our predictions
can be applied in the context of the standard criminal justice system. As we have noted in
Section 2, there is evidence that judges have some room influencing the probability of conviction
and their decisions are often influenced by their own preferences as well as social incentives like
peer opinion, apart from material incentives. Obviously, the maneuvering room for judges is not
the same in every context. We expect greater applicability of our model in cases where judges
have a greater influence over the probability of conviction. This is more likely in cases where
the decision of the judge is more hidden from the public eye, but can be monitored by some
select group of individuals, described as the peer group in our model. Our results also have more
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relevance in situations when there is some “schism” between public and elite opinion, or, in other
settings, a difference in general between the reputational incentives of rule-setters or lawmakers,
and those who apply the rules. The perverse result predicted under certain conditions in our
model is also more likely to occur when there are not too many peer groups that judges can
choose from. In the following we consider some settings where our results are especially relevant,
both from a descriptive and from a policy perspective. Also, the more personal the relationship
might be between investigators and the investigated, the more we should expect this relationship
to hold, and the more we should worry about the perverse effects of strict punishments.
We begin with one of our motivating examples, the current schism in most European coun-
tries between general public opinion and the opinion of intellectual groups. Majorities in many
European countries support capital punishment. This support is much weaker among more edu-
cated and higher income individuals, especially among “progressives” (see Whitehead et al, 1999).
This seems to be the case in the case of many other forms of punishment, as well. Considering
this, we expect the perverse result to be more likely in smaller European countries, where the
schism between the general population and the “elite” on the matter of crime and punishment
is coupled with a relatively small and homogeneous “elite”. On the other hand, in the United
States, while progressive views are increasingly common among intellectuals, there still seems to
be many ideological groups and subgroups.
Our predictions may have relevance in the area of economic crimes, as well. Two examples
in particular might be rules related to tax evasion and tax fraud as well as collusion among
firms. In the latter case, it has been traditionally the case that only the firm itself gets punished
for violations of competition law. A crucial problem with this traditional approach that it
does not provide sufficient incentives against collusion, as the punishment is distributed among
shareholders and the executive is not held responsible for the collusion. Considering this problem,
many countries have enacted changes in the law according to which the executive or the executive
directors can also be held liable in collusion cases. However, one problem with this approach, is
that competition authorities and courts typically apply a higher threshold of reasonable doubt
when deciding in a case where the punishment must be applied to one or more individuals as
opposed to a firm. Therefore, increasing the punishment for collusion for the executive (from
zero to non-zero level) might be coupled with a decrease in the probability that a firm gets any
punishment for collusion. The final effect on the expected punishment might be unclear.
Another area where our model could be applied, with some modifications, is the investigation
and punishment of crimes and other rule-breaking behavior (including breaking certain specifi-
cally religious or job-specific proscriptions) among clergy. For example, the Catholic Church has
an autonomous body that adjudicates claims of crimes that is independent of secular authorities
and it can issue punishments against its members. An especially stern form of ecclesiastical
punishment is excommunication, which basically means an end of a priestly career, and could
mean even more for a religious individual. Obviously, certain crimes such as the sexual abuse of
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children often incite demand for very strict punishment within the Church as well as the gen-
eral criminal justice system. Here the incentives faced by the Church leadership are ambiguous.
First, the Church leadership might receive reputational benefits from a tough approach toward
crimes committed by clergymen. The reputational benefit, however, is received by the Church
as a whole, so even Church leaders might be unlikely to internalize the full reputational benefits
of action against crimes allegedly committed by priests. However, leaders certainly derive some
part of this benefit, therefore they still have some incentives for stricter punishment. Church
leaders who take part in the investigation might have other incentives as well, however. First,
there might be criminals among their peers, or their peers might disapprove of the possible
convictions. While most of the positive reputational benefits might go to the highest Church
leaders, such as the Pope, who devise the rules, individual investigators might face higher cost
from offending their peers, especially if they still have career ambitions.
Another area where there is a system of punishment that is distinct from the general criminal
justice system is the army. There are martial courts where traditionally the strictest punish-
ment has been the death penalty (that is not the case any more in most of the Western world).
Similarly to the case of the Church, the incentives of the army leaders and those involved in
investigating allegations against army personnel can be very different. Army leaders arguably
internalize more of the reputational costs and benefits that are conferred to the army as a whole,
while investigators, as in the case of ecclesiastical investigations, might either have personal stakes
in cases or are subject to peer pressure. For instance, war crimes and sexual crimes committed
by army personnel might not be properly investigated due to a sense of solidarity among army
members. Note however, that reputational concerns can incentivize both the furthering as well
as stifling of investigations, depending on the probability that a particular allegation becomes
known to the public. Given the above incentives in the army, it is possible that increasing the
severity of punishment for military crimes and misdemeanors can decrease the probability that
an investigation will begin or end with a conviction.
The intuition of our model can also be applied to regulatory enforcement. One of the central
problems facing European labor markets are labor market rigidities that are often the result of
inefficient regulations (see e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). However, new empirical results
by Kanbur and Ronconi (2016) suggest a counterveiling effect provided by the enforcement of
these regulations: according to the results, the strictness of employment regulations correlate
with weak levels of enforcement. This relationship makes the possible effect of stricter or more
rigid labor regulations, or any type of regulations, ambiguous. Regulatory agencies might weaken
enforcement in response to the stricter rules, thus the effective regulatory burden can increase
as well as decrease, depending on the magnitude of changes in the rules versus the enforcement
intensity.
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5.2 Extensions
One limitation of our approach taken in this paper is that we treat the punishment enhancement
α as exogenously given, whereas it could be assumed that α can be chosen by the lawmaker.
In real life, both of these intuitions can find some support. If we take the example of classic
punishments like life in prison, the absence of the possibility of parole or capital punishment,
these punishments are not made up by the current lawmaker, rather, their application is what
gets decided by her. However, when the law prescribes punishment enhancements that, for
instance, add a certain number of years to the punishment, this number is actually determined
by the lawmaking body. The reason we have taken α as given is that we wanted to show the
implications of it, including the possible perverse effect of a mandatory punishment enhancement.
However, if the lawmaker can choose the value of α, se can avoid such perverse results. In our
model it is assumed that the lawmaker does not care about social welfare, including deterrence, so
even if we allowed a choice of α, the lawmaker would not be interested in minimizing the perverse
effect of a punishment enhancement. However, if she wished to, she could achieve undoing the
perverse effect of introducing α by setting α so that α > p
′
p − 1, which comes directly from
equation (7). The more lenient the judge is, the higher α needs to be in order to offset the effects
of leniency. However, this is only one way the lawmaker could outweigh the potentially perverse
effect of punishment enhancement. One other way to do that is to directly incentivize judges
not to lower the probability of conviction after the x¯ threshold. This can be done more easily
in states where the judicial branch is, either formally or informally, not fully independent from
executive power. Therefore, we expect liberal democracies to be more prone to the problem we
described in this paper. However, as we have not assumed that lawmakers care about deterrence,
our analysis suggests that lawmakers in democratic countries probably face greater incentives to
introduce criminal legislations that have perverse effects on deterrence. While non-democratic
leaders might be expected to internalize more of the benefit from criminal deterrence, democratic
leaders are more responsive to public opinion.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the relationship between the severity and the probability of
punishment when there are psychic costs judges derive from giving out certain punishments.
The type of cost we consider specifically is the disutility the judge gets from deviating from the
views of her peers. Due to this effect, we have found that increasing the severity of punishment,
in certain cases, can decrease the expected punishment faced by the criminal and, therefore, can
both increase and decrease the level of criminal behavior. Such an effect is less likely the more peer
groups judges can join, which can be assumed to be correlated with country size. One consequence
of this is that we expect the perverse result of punishment enhancement most likely to occur in
countries with sufficiently pro-punishment general population and with relatively homogeneous,
sufficiently anti-punishment “elite”. We have also considered a few possible applications and
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extensions of our model, including child abuse allegations in the catholic Church or decision
making in martial courts. However, quantitative empirical studies are needed in order to test
the predictions provided by our paper.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1: See equations (5) and (6) for the first order conditions under p and
p′. When either p or p′ increases, the expected marginal punishment increases, which implies
that the optimal criminal level x needs to be chosen at a higher level of marginal benefit. The
above combined with the concavity of B(x) implies a lower x. The same holds for changes in F
(which is exogenously given in the model). A change in α increases the total cost of punishment
in Case II. As α is a fixed cost, it cannot influence the marginal decision, only the optimum
selection. Consider an initial optimal choice x∗ > x¯ and x∗′ ≤ x¯ as an other possible optimum.
Suppose that initially, p′(F (x∗) + α) < pF (x∗′). There is a large enough increase inα such that
p′(F (x∗) + α) > pF (x∗′), so the criminal chooses the lower crime level.
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider the first order conditions in the two branches of the criminal’s
utility function. In Case I, the first order condition yields ∂B(x)∂x = p
∂F (x)
∂x . In Case II it yields
∂B(x)
∂x = p
′ ∂F (x)
∂x . Suppose p
′ < p. Suppose there is an optimal solution x∗ that satisfies the first
order condition in Case I. Then if the lawmaker lowers the threshold x¯, there exists a sufficient
decrease in the threshold such that x∗ is no longer optimal. There is a new downward kink in
the expected punishment function that is below the original optimal choice. The new optimal
choice in Case I is the same, but in Case II the optimal choice is either the same or lower than
previously. It is the same only if Case II does not yield an interior solution (x = 1) under either
the old or the new threshold.
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 3 We consider two cases. In the first case, p′ > p. It is easy to see that
in Case II the criminal faces a higher marginal expected punishment. If the condition in the
proposition also holds (and in this case it always does as α > 0 by definition), x∗ cannot exceed
x¯, as the criminal can only make herself worse off by choosing a crime level above the threshold.
Now consider the case when p′ < p. Here the marginal expected punishment decreases above
x¯. This implies an x∗′ > x¯. Suppose the optimal choice in Case II is x∗. We can modify the
condition in the proposition as p′(F (x∗′) + α) > pF (x∗) The criminal is therefore better off
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choosing x∗ < x∗′. x∗ must be lower or equal to x¯ as above the kink x∗′ is the optimal choice,
therefore x∗ cannot be the optimal choice in Case II, so it must locate either at the kink or below
it. Therefore, if α is great enough to offset a decrease in p, the chosen crime level will never
exceed x¯.
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